The takeover literature shows that offer premiums increase cross-sectionally with pre-offer target stock price runups. Using a simple takeover model, we examine whether this correlation reflects a costly feedback loop from runups to deal terms, in which bidders effectively pay twice for anticipated target synergies embedded in runups. The model shows that, when takeover rumors cause investors to update about the expected deal value, the conventional intuition that offer premiums should be cross-sectionally independent of runups does not hold. Our large-sample evidence support rational deal anticipation in runups but strongly rejects the existence of a costly feedback loop from runups to offer premiums. We also show that bidder takeover gains increase cross-sectionally with target gains and runups, as predicted when bidders share in synergy gains. We conclude that target runups do not increase bidder takeover costs at the intensive margin.
Introduction
Takeover bids are typically preceded by substantial target stock price runups. If the runup reflects market anticipation of target deal synergies, increasing the offer price with the runup amounts to paying twice for those expected synergies-a seemingly unlikely outcome of rational merger negotiations. Yet, the takeover literature reports evidence that offer premiums increase almost dollar for dollar with runups in the cross-section of bids, which raises the question of whether prebid target runups in fact increase bidder takeover costs (Schwert, 1996) . The possible existence of a costly feedback loop from runups to deal terms is of first-order importance for parties to merger negotiations as well as for the debate over the efficiency of the takeover mechanism. In this paper, we derive new and testable implications of a costly feeback loop using a simple takeover model with rational deal anticipation, and subject the model predictions to large-scale empirical tests.
Our takeover model focuses on the relationship between the runup and the subsequent offer price markup (the offer premium less the runup). In the model, the sequence of events starts with rational market participants receiving a positive signal about a synergistic takeover, providing information about both potential deal value and the (implied) deal probability. This is followed by a bid announcement which resolves bid uncertainty and results in the markup. We consider first a setting without a costly feedback loop, and then expand the analysis to incorporate market expectations that merger negotiations force bidders to raise the offer premium with the runup. We also consider implications for the correlation between bidder and target returns.
The model demonstrates that the theoretical relationship between the runup and the markup implied by deal anticipation in runups is considerably more complex than previously thought.
Conventional intuition suggests that, when offer premiums do not respond to the runup, higher runups should be offset dollar-for-dollar by lower markups across a sample of takeover bids (Schwert, 1996) . However, this intuition holds only if the deal value is held constant (so the takeover signal provides information about deal probability only). When the deal value varies in the cross-section, it positively influences both the runup and the markup and significantly changes the runup-markup relation under rational market deal anticipation.
To illustrate, suppose the market receives a low takeover signal, which under the traditional intuition results in a low runup (low deal anticipation) followed by a high markup if a deal is an-1 nounced (the unanticipated portion of the constant deal value). When the signal also informs about deal value, however, the low signal implies both a low takeover probability and a low conditional expected deal value. Since, with rational expectations, the low deal value tends to be confirmed by the subsequent deal announcement, runups and markups are both low. Conversely, high signals result in higher markups than conventionally predicted since the deal value tends to be higher as well. We show that, over the entire signal spectrum, the link between runups and markups is always greater than minus one-for-one, is inherently non-linear, and may even be positive.
Next, we model a type of bargaining outcome inspired by Schwert (1996) 's concept of "markup pricing"-which he defines as the offer price being raised by the target runup-perhaps reflecting time pressure to close valuable deals. In our model, the runup transfer is costly as the offer price is increased by a runup caused by anticipation of deal synergies as opposed to by a change in the target's stand-alone value. In other words, the bidder effectively pays twice for the anticipated synergies embedded in the runup, which reduces the bidder's share of the total synergy gains. Importantly, the model allows us to explicitly account for the deterrent effect of the runup transfer on otherwise marginally profitable bidders.
Again, our baseline assumption that takeover signals inform investors about expected deal value changes intuition about the link between runups and markups under markup pricing. For example, Schwert (1996) suggests that markups will be independent of the runup when the offer premium is increased by the runup. However, we show that, when the feedback loop from the runup to the offer premium is costly as modeled here, markups will be strictly increasing in the runup. Intuitively, whatever the size of the runup caused by deal anticipation, the markup has to be at least as large or the bidder has not actually paid twice for the synergies embedded in the runup. More specifically, the markup now equals the deal value itself (it is the sum of the unexpected deal value and the runup transfer, where the latter equals the expected deal value), and so higher takeover signals drive up both the runup and the markup.
Turning to the empirical analysis, in our sample of 6,150 initial takeover bids for U.S. public targets , the implication of a uniformly positive relation between runups and markups is robustly rejected. In other words, bidders do not appear to pay twice for runups caused by deal anticipation. At the same time, the form of the markup projection predicted by our baseline deal anticipation theory, without the costly feedback loop, receives strong empirical support.
Importantly, our empirical analysis accounts for changes in target stand-alone values during the runup period. Such changes may be passed on to target shareholders through a higher offer premium without increasing bidder takeover costs. Target stand-alone value changes, which are unobservable to the econometrician, therefore introduce an errors-in-variables problem when using observed runups as a proxy for anticipated target synergies. To address this problem, we develop a novel estimator that decomposes observed runups into its two components-anticipated deal value and stand-alone value change-and isolate the deal value component.
This adjustment is particularly important for the approximately one-third of all targets that experience negative pre-bid runups. According to our model, these targets have experienced a negative stand-alone value change attenuated by the partially anticipated synergy gains. Interestingly, our econometric procedure for isolating those expected synergy gains succeeds in converting more than ninety-seven percent of the observed negative runups to positive values. Moreover, tests on these positive adjusted runups only strengthen our conclusion that target runups reflect partially anticipated deal synergies, and that the costly feedback hypothesis is rejected.
Our takeover model also points to an interesting implication for bidder takeover gains. When the market partially anticipates deal synergies, bidder takeover gains will be increasing in the target's pre-bid runup and total gain. That is, when the merger partners share in the synergy gains (as our model assumes), greater target deal values reflected in target gains and runups will be associated with greater bidder deal values as well. Our empirical evidence strongly supports this prediction.
We also use the model framework to motivate two additional empirical investigations. First, consistent with the prediction that offer prices should be adjusted for observable changes in target stand-alone values, we show that offer premiums change almost one-for-one with the market return over the runup period. It appears that market-driven changes in target value, which are arguably exogenous to the takeover synergy gains, are passed through to the target. Second, we examine effects of significant trades in the target shares during the runup period. We find that such block trades tend to fuel runups whether the buyer is the initial bidder or some other investor. However, there is no evidence that the additional runup is associated with higher offer premiums. This evidence therefore fails to support the notion that bidder toehold purchases in the runup period increase takeover costs.
Our paper adds to the growing empirical literature examining possible feedback loops from market prices to corrective actions taken by bidders in takeovers. For example, Luo (2005) and Kau, Linck, and Rubin (2008) report that negative bidder stock returns following initial bid announcements increase the chance of subsequent bid withdrawal. It is as if bidders learn from the information in the negative market reaction and in some cases decide to abandon further merger plans. We do not pursue this issue here as our empirical tests are not impacted by a decision to abandon after the initial offer has been made. However, our findings suggest that the chance of abandonment will be lower for targets with relatively large pre-bid runups, since these targets likely represent deals with greater total synergies to be shared with the bidder.
Also, there is an interesting indirect link between our evidence and the findings of recent studies such as Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) and Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) who link takeover activity to broad stock market movements. It appears that positive market-wide price shocks (exogenous to takeovers) are associated with a reduction in takeover likelihood at the extensive margin. At first, this may seem to contradict our finding that bidder gains in observed bids are increasing in target runups. However, there is no necessary contradiction as we model synergistic takeovers. While target runups may deter bids driven by attempts to acquire undervalued target assets, bids driven by bidder-specific synergy gains remain undeterred-and possibly end up in our sample.
Finally, our evidence of deal anticipation in the runup is consistent with the extant evidence that target runups in observed bids tend to revert back to zero following bid rejection (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983; Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2009 ). This characterizes the unsuccessful bids in our sample as well. The logic here is that if bids are primarily motivated by targets being undervalued by the stock market, and if runups tend to correct the undervaluation, then the runup would represent a permanent change in the target value, irrespective of a subsequent control change.
In contrast, runups that discount expected synergy gains from a control change, as in our takeover model, will revert back when it becomes clear to the market that the offer will fail. The fitted forms of the markup projection shown in this paper are generally consistent with the latter but not with the former source of the runup.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the takeover model and its testable implications, while section 3 presents the results of our main empirical tests. Section 4 examines effects of exogenous shocks to the target value in the runup period, while Section 5 4 concludes the paper. All formal proofs are in the Appendix.
A takeover model with rational deal anticipation
By way of motivation, Figure 1 illustrates the information arrival process assumed in our analysis, and shows the economic significance of the average target price revisions for our sample of 6,150 takeover bids (sample description follows in Section 3 below). The market receives a rumor or signal s causing investors to anticipate that a synergistic takeover bid will occur with probability 0 < π(s) ≤ 1, resulting in a target stock price runup of V R (s). In Figure 1 , V R (s) averages a significant 8% when measured as the abnormal target stock return over the two months prior to the first public offer announcement (unadjusted for market movements, V R (s) averages 10%). The subsequent (surprise) offer announcement leads to a second target price revision or "markup" of
, where V P (s) is the expected target deal value conditional on the offer announcement.
In Figure 1 , the markup averages 21% when estimated as the target abnormal stock return over the three-day offer announcement period (from day -1 through day +1). 1
Below, we formally model the relationship between the runup V R (s) and the markup V P (s) − V R (s). We begin in Section 2.1 with a baseline model which abstracts from the possibility of a costly market feedback loop, which is introduced 2.2. In Section 2.3 we derive testable implications of rational deal anticipation for the relationship between bidder and target takeover gains. The central empirical predictions, which are nested within the same theoretical framework, are summarized in Table 1 at the beginning of Section 3.1.
The baseline takeover model
We normalize to zero both the target stock price and the takeover probability prior to receiving the takeover signal s. 2 Let s reveal the potential for takeover synergies equal to S. The synergies are known to the bidder and the target, while the market only knows the conditional density g(S|s).
We assume that s represents "good news" (Milgrom, 1981) in the sense that higher s shifts the conditional density g(S|s) to the right so that both the expected deal value and the deal probability increase: dV P /ds > 0 and dπ(s)/ds > 0 (given that a bid is uncertain). 3
The takeover negotiations split the synergies using a known sharing rule θ ∈ [0, 1] and the bidder receives θS. The bidder bears a known bidding cost C and will bid only if S ≥ K, where K ≡ C/θ is the rational bid threshold. Bidding costs include things like advisory fees and litigation risk, as well as any opportunity cost of expected synergy gains from a better business combination than the target under consideration. The target receives B = (1 − θ)S from a takeover, while B = 0 if there is no takeover under the assumption that generating synergies requires a target control change. 4
The target valuations are as follows. The expected target deal value conditional on receiving a takeover bid is
which implies the target runup
and the markup
Equation (3) shows that the relation between the markup and the signal s is the product of two opposing forces: higher signals lower the deal surprise 1 − π(s) and increase the conditional target deal value V P (s). 5
Figure 2 illustrates these valuation functions under uniform uncertainty:
with density g(S|s) = 1/(2∆). 6 Rational bidding requires s > K − ∆ for a bid to occur with positive probability, which is the starting value for s along the horizontal axis in Figure 2A .
Beginning with the target deal value, V P increases linearly with s after a minimum value ("intercept") of (1 − θ)K just after s = K − ∆. Note that this intercept is increasing in C because, 3 The density shifts in this manner if the shift satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), which implies first-order stochastic dominance. Shifts in location satisfies MLRP for a broad class of probability distributions, including the normal, exponential and uniform.
4 This assumption is supported by evidence on unsuccessful targets both in our sample and in the extant literature (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008) .
5 To simplify the exposition, we henceforth suppress the argument s. 6 with rational bidders, feasible bids must produce sufficient synergies to cover bidding costs. Given a low signal s, if C = 0, the intercept of V P is small as S tends to be close to zero in observed bids.
Conversely, a high C cuts off low-value bidders which increases the conditional expected value of S|s and therefore the intercept.
Next, the runup V R = πV P starts at zero and increases in a convex fashion with the signal. At low signals, V R is close to zero because bidders are near indifferent to making offers (both π and V P are low), while higher signals mean both higher deal probabilities and greater expected deal values.
The markup function V P − V R is highly nonlinear and concave for K − ∆ < s ≤ K + ∆ where 0 < π ≤ 1. Because K < ∆ in the figure, the markup reaches a maximum at s = 0, and with the uniform distribution declines to zero when s ≥ K + ∆. 7 Intuitively, for low signal values, the markup is low because the deal announcement tends to confirm the low target deal value V P anticipated by the market. As the signal increases, the positive effect on the deal value initially dominates the negative effect of the signal on deal surprise 1 − π, causing the markup to increase with the signal strength. Following the inflexion point (at s = 0), the reverse happens: the decline in deal surprise from greater signal values dominates the increase in deal value, and the markup decreases in the signal.
Whether or not the markup function displays an internal maximum-and a positively sloped part as in Figure 2A -depends on the magnitude of actual bidding costs relative to the uncertainty in the signal. If C is high, the deal value V P and therefore also the markup, starts high. For example, if we set K > ∆ in Figure 2A , bids are feasible for positive signal values only, and the markup declines in a nonlinear fashion throughout the range of feasible bids.
To make this theory testable we transform the unobservable signal s to the observable runup V R . This transformation is possible because, under our assumption that s is good news, both V P and V R are monotonic in s and have inverses. Using equations (2) and (3), we form the following markup projection,
which may be estimated on a sample of takeover bids. The form in (4) is general in that it does not depend on the form of the target benefit function B(S), the size of the threshold value K, or on the distributional properties of S|s.
Our markup projection (4) clarifies an important assumption implicit in the traditional linear regression tests for deal anticipation in runups. The linear model can be written
where a and b are regression constants, and where the prediction is b = −1 (a dollar increase in the runup should be offset by a dollar decrease in the markup). Equating (5) and (4), and replacing
This says that for the markup projection to be linear with b = −1, it must also be that a = V P . In other words, the traditional test requires that the target deal value is cross-sectionally constant.
Proposition 1 identifies an important, empirically testable restriction on the linear slope coefficient b when V P is not constant and the general markup projection holds:
Proposition 1: Suppose the markup projection (4) holds. When the takeover signal causes the market to infer different takeover probability and deal values across a sample of takeovers (dπ/ds > 0 and dV P /ds > 0), then the linear regression (5) produces a slope coefficient b that is strictly greater than -1.
Proof: The derivative of the markup projection (4) w.r.t the signal s is:
where A ≡ V P dπ ds and B ≡ π dV P ds . Over the range where V P > 0 and 0 < π < 1, MLRP implies dV P /ds > 0 and dπ/ds > 0, and so both A and B are positive. Figure 2B illustrates how the markup varies with the runup when the distribution of S given 8 Since VR is monotonic in s, it has an inverse and so
s is uniform (the solid curve) and normal (dotted curve, scaled to have the same mean deviation).
The slope of the markup projection is clearly nonconstant when 0 < π < 1. The intuition for this nonlinearity is analogous to that presented for Figure 2A above. The slope at the left hand tail again depends on the bidding costs C. Because K < ∆ in the figure (bid costs are low relative to the synergy uncertainty), the slope starts positive for low V R and reaches a maximum before trending negative. The slope at the right hand tail drops towards zero because the deal probability approaches one (and becomes zero with the uniform distribution but not with the normal uncertainty as the probability never reaches one). 9
Markup projection with costly feedback loop
In this section we introduce a costly feedback loop from target runups to deal terms. The feedback loop means that the bidder transfers the runup to the target through a higher offer price. This implies a bid of
where superscript * indicates the new bid threshold value
in (8) is the new conditional expected target deal value (given the new bid threshold), while the second term is the costly runup transfer. The latter is financed from-and thus limited by-the bidder's net takeover gains. As illustrated below, the higher bid threshold K * both lowers the takeover probability and increases the conditional expected target deal value relative to the case without a costly feedback loop.
Using (8), the runup is
and the markup is
That is, the markup must now equal the conditional target deal value. While this may seem surprising at first, the explanation is simple. The markup now consists of two components: the surprise target deal value (1 − π * E * (B|s, bid)) and the surprise runup transfer. Since the latter equals the anticipated part of the target deal value (π * E(B|s, bid)), these two components necessarily sum to E * (B|s, bid)-the conditional expected target deal value itself. Figure 3A illustrates the runup and markup as functions of the signal s and again assuming a uniform posterior for the synergies S. The parameter values are as in Figure 2A (see footnote 4).
As before, the runup is increasing throughout the range of the takeover signal s. More importantly, now the markup is also increasing over the entire signal range: as the runup increases with s, offers in which bidder net synergy gains are too low to finance the runup transfer cost are eliminated, and so the conditional target expected deal value E * (B|s, bid) increases. Figure 3A also plots the probability π * (right vertical axis). Since K * > K, it follows that π * < π for all values of s. This lowering of the deal probability is quite dramatic: when s = K + ∆ in Figure 3A -a signal value that in Figure 2A produces a certain bid-π * is only 0.37.
Also, since the runup transfer must be financed from the bidder's portion of the takeover gain, π * must be less than θ. To see why, write the condition for positive expected bidder net gain with a runup transfer as:
which reduces to
As s → ∞, the right-hand-side of (12) converges towards θ (which has a value of 0.5 in Figure 3A ).
Since the markup projection (4) holds also for the case with a costly feedback loop, we can write
Importantly, this projection has a positive slope everywhere:
Proposition 2: Suppose markup projection (4) holds. When merger negotiations force rational bidders to raise the offer price with the runup (costly feedback loop), the markup becomes a positive and monotonic function of the runup, and the linear markup regression (5) will yield a positive slope coefficient (b > 0).
Proof: See Appendix A.1. Figure 3B plots the markup projection for the case with a costly runup transfer. In contrast to the case in Figure 2A where the markup falls after reaching a maximum value, the markup in Figure 3A is monotonically increasing in the runup, approaching a near-linear form already for low values of V R . It is therefore straightforward that the costly feedback hypothesis is rejected if a linear markup regression produces a statistically significant negative slope in a sample of takeovers.
Deal anticipation and bidder returns
Finally, we turn to the relation between bidder and target valuations in our model. Given the sharing rule 0 < θ < 1, greater total synergies S result in greater bidder gains G(S) where, under rational bidding with no costly feedback, G(S) = θSC. Thus, as with targets, a takeover signal results in a runup in the bidders value, and a subsequent bid further raises this value as bid uncertainty is resolved. Let ν P denote the bidders conditional expected value of the takeover, measured in excess of the stand-alone valuation at the beginning of the runup period. Analogous to equation (1), we have that
Proposition 3: Rational deal anticipation and rational bidder behavior imply the following:
(i) Bidder and target takeover gains are positively correlated: Cov(G, B) > 0.
(ii) Bidder takeover gains and target runups are positively correlated:
Proof: Proof of part (i) follows directly from the sharing rule for synergy gains:
follows from the definition of the target runup and the fact that observed S equals its conditional expectation E(S|s, bid) plus noise: S|s, bid) , πE(S|s, bid)). Since both E(S|s, bid) and π(s) are increasing in s (by our assumption above that s represents "good news" in the sense of MLRP), this covariance is positive.
As an alternative to Proposition 3, consider again the situation where the signal s informs investors about deal probability but not about the deal value (referred to above as the information environment implicit in the conventional intuition). In this conventional case, Cov(G, B) > 0 (since both firms share in S, which is random) while Cov(S, s) = 0 (since s is uninformative about deal the value and so E(S|s, bid) does not vary with s). Thus, in a regression of bidder gains ν P on the target runup V R , while Proposition 3 predicts a positive slope coefficient the more restrictive conventional case predicts a slope of zero.
Furthermore, if we add a costly feedback loop to the conventional case, so that the bidder pays the target both (1 − θ)S and a portion of any deal anticipation, then the correlation between bidder gains and target runups becomes negative (Cov(G, V R ) < 0). This follows because bidders transfer more of the synergy gains to the target as anticipation increases while, by assumption, the total expected synergy gains remains constant. Thus, in this case, gains to the bidder decrease on average with increasing target runups: the slope in a regression of ν P on V R should be negative.
We now turn to a large-scale empirical analysis of the above propositions and related hypotheses.
3 Deal anticipation and feedback loop: Empirical tests 3.1 Empirical test strategy Table 1 summarizes the central empirical hypotheses nested within the rational deal anticipation framework developed above. The first column repeats the theoretical form of the economic model, while columns two and three describe the associated econometric model and (a total of eleven) empirical tests. We begin with the baseline deal anticipation hypothesis (Proposition 1). This states that, under deal anticipation, the predicted value of the linear slope coefficient is b > −1.
Moreover, the general markup function (4) is inherently nonlinear, as illustrated in Figure 2B .
We explore the presence of nonlinearities using a flexible functional form (the beta function), and perform several goodness-of-fit tests for nonlinearity against the hypothesis that the markup projection is linear.
The estimates of the linear slope coefficient b directly address the costly feedback loop hypothesis, which predicts that the markup should be increasing everywhere in the runup (Proposition 2). Evidence of a statistically significant negative slope coefficient in the linear markup regression therefore constitutes a powerful rejection of the existence of our costly feedback loop hypothesis.
Combining propositions 1 and 2, finding −1 < b < 0 simultaneously rejects the existence of a costly feedback loop while supporting rational deal anticipation in runups.
While not modeled explicitly in Section 2, the empirical analysis also addresses the possibility of a change of T dollars (positive or negative) in the target's stand-alone value during the runup period. The presence of a known T does not affect the above theory. However, it attenuates the slope coefficient and reduces power to detect the nonlinearities in the runup-markup relation implied by the synergy component itself. More specifically, while T does not affect the markup (as the difference between the premium and the runup automatically nets out T ), it introduces an errors-in-variables problem in the runup.
We therefore develop an estimator for T which allows us to subtract the estimated value of T from the observed total runup, and repeat the key empirical tests with the adjusted runup (the estimated synergy component) as the independent variable. We also perform several other robustness checks on the way V R and V P are measured. Notice that, throughout the empirical analysis, we use V R and V P to denote observed runups and offer premiums although these may include a nonzero T . This represents a slight notational change relative to Section 2 above where V R and V P assumes T = 0. This notational change is purely for convenience and should not cause confusion.
Rational deal anticipation and rational bidding further implies that bidder takeover gains are increasing in the target gains and runup (Proposition 3). We test this proposition by regressing the estimated bidder gain ν P on the target gains V P and the runup V R (with additional firmand deal-specific control variables). The predicted slope is positive-with or without a costly feedback loop. If, contrary to our model, the takeover signal does not inform investors about deal value (so dV P /ds = 0), then the predicted linear slope coefficient in the regression of bidder gains on target runup is zero. If dV R /ds = 0 and our costly feedback loop exists, then this slope coefficient is predicted to be negative. This slope coefficient is also predicted to be negative if bidders systematically make value-reducing bids (whether or not there exists a costly feedback loop).
The empirical analysis also examines two additional linear regression specifications which ad-13 dress potential offer price effects of known shocks to the target runup. The first is the (exogenous) market return over the runup period, and the second is a major block trade in the target shares such as a bidder toehold purchase. We test whether either of these two factors fuel target runups and, if so, if they result in increased offer prices.
Characteristics of the takeover sample
As summarized in Table 2 , we sample control bids from SDC using transaction form "merger" or "acquisition of majority interest", requiring the target to be publicly traded and U.S. domiciled.
The sample period is 1/1980-12/2008. In a control bid, the buyer owns less than 50% of the target shares prior to the bid and seeks to own at least 50% of the target equity. Approximately three-quarters of the control bids are merger offers and 10% are followed by a bid revision or competing offer from a rival bidder. The frequency of tender offers and multiple-bid contests is higher in the first half of the sample period. The initial bidder wins control of the target in two-thirds of the contests, with a higher success probability towards the end of the sample period. One-fifth of the control bids are horizontal. A bid is horizontal if the target and acquirer has the same 4-digit SIC code in CRSP or, when the acquirer is private, the same 4-digit SIC code in SDC. 10 10 Based on the major four-digit SIC code of the target, approximately one-third of the sample targets are in Table 3 shows average premiums, markups, and runups, both annually and for the total sample.
The initial offer premium is
− 1, where OP is the initial offer price and P −42 is the target stock closing price or, if missing, the bid/ask average on trading day −42, adjusted for splits and dividends. The bid is announced on day 0. Offer prices are from SDC. The offer premium averages 45% for the total sample, with a median of 38%. Offer premiums were highest in the 1980s when the frequency of tender offers and hostile bids was also greater, and lowest after 2003. The next two columns show the initial offer markup,
− 1, which is the ratio of the offer price to the target stock price on day −2. The markup is 33% for the average control bid (median 27%).
The target runup, defined as
− 1, averages 10% for the total sample (median 7%), which is roughly one quarter of the offer premium. While not shown in the table, average runups vary considerably across offer categories, with the highest runup for tender offers and the lowest in bids that subsequently fail. The latter is interesting because it indicates that runups reflect the probability of bid success, as expected under the deal anticipation hypothesis. The last two columns of Table 3 show the net runup, defined as the runup net of the average market runup (
where M is the value of the equal-weighted market portfolio). The net runup is 8% on average, with a median of 5%. Table 4 shows the results of estimating the markup projection on our sample of 6,150 initial takeover bids. For each model, the table shows the constant term and slope from estimating the baseline linear markup projection, along with three test statistics for nonlinearity. All estimates are produced using the beta distribution, denoted Λ(v, w) where v and w are shape parameters determined by the data:
Estimating the markup projections using offer prices
Here, max and min are, respectively, the maximum and minimum V R in the data, a is an overall intercept, b is a scale parameter, and is a residual error term. The estimated shape parameters v and w determine whether the beta density suggests the projection is concave, convex, peaked at manufacturing industries, one-quarter are in the financial industry, and one quarter are service companies. The remaining targets are spread over natural resources, trade and other industries. the left, right or both tails, unimodal with the hump toward the right or left, or linear. 11
Beginning with the first hypothesis in Table 1 (nonlinearity, and linear slope b > −1), recall that Figure 2B suggests a unimodal fit with the hump to the left and the right tail declining towards zero as the takeover signal increases and deals become increasingly certain. Figure 4A plots our sample total runups and total markups as defined in row (1) of Table 4 using three alternative estimated functions: (i) the best linear fit (constrained to have v = 1 and w = 2 or vice versa),
(ii) the best nonlinear monotone fit (constrained to have v ≤ 1), and (iii) the best nonlinear fit (unconstrained) of the markup on the runup.
The unconstrained empirical fit in Figure 4A is quite similar to the theoretical shape in Figure   2B , trending towards a markup of about 20% for high runups. 12 The hump to the left in Figure   4A is driven by a subset of takeovers with low runups and, yet, with lower markups than predicted by either a linear or a nonlinear-but-monotone fit, as our theory predicts. Takeovers of poorly performing targets are not uncommon-there are targets with negative runups in about 30% of our sample-reflecting negative changes in the target's stand-alone value during the runup period. We return to an adjustment for negative runups in Section 3.4 below.
The last three columns in Table 4 show three goodness-of-fit likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics applied to the data in Figure 4A . The likelihood ratio is calculated as LR =
where SSE is the sum of squared errors for the constrained and the unconstrained model specifications, respectively, and N is the sample size. For large samples, −2ln(LR) ∼ χ 2 (d), where d is the number of model restrictions (Theil, 1971, p. 396) . We have verified that this likelihood ratio test statistic shows close correspondence to χ 2 distribution near the 1% significance level when using simulated, linear markups with normal errors.
Of the three LR statistics in Table 4 , the first, LR1, tests for nonlinearity against the alternative of a linear form (d = 2). The second, LR2, tests nonlinearity against monotonicity (d = 1). The third, LR3 ≡ LR1 − LR2, tests monotonicity against linearity (d = 1). The 1% critical value for LR1 is 9.2, while for LR2 and LR3 it is 6.6. With the exception of LR3 for model (3) and (4) in Table 4 , where runups and markups are measured using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) rather than offer prices, all the reported LR values substantially exceed their respective 1% cutoff points. All the LR1 values across all the models strongly reject linearity in favor of the unrestricted nonlinear form. Moreover, all the LR2 values reject monotonicity in favor of non-monotonicity.
Finally, with the exception of models (3) and (4), the LR3 values also reject linearity against monotonicity. 13 The results of the linear regressions in Table 4 are important. Recall from Proposition 1 that the baseline deal anticipation hypothesis predicts a linear slope coefficient of b > −1. The estimated slope coefficients reported in Table 4 have values that are significantly greater than -1, with the exception of model (2) where b = −1.01 (discussed further below). For example, the estimated slope coefficient for model (1) is -0.24 which has a t-value of -11.9 against zero and (not reported) a t-value of 37.7 against −1. Moreover, all of the slope coefficient estimates across the six models are negative and significantly different from zero. This evidence simultaneously rejects our costly feedback loop hypothesis where the bidder pays twice for the portion of the target runup caused by anticipation of takeover synergies-and which predicts b > 0-and supports the hypothesis that runups reflect rational deal anticipation.
Adjusting runups for target stand-alone value changes
In this section, we consider the effect of the presence of a stand-alone value change of T dollars (positive or negative) to the target value in the runup period. While unobservable to the econometrician, we assume for simplicity that T is known to the negotiators. 14 The source of T may be an exogenous change in the value of the target resources in their second-best use, possibly (but not necessarily) caused by the takeover signal itself. Since all claims are conditionally correctly priced in the model in Section 2 above, T does not represent a source of takeover gain nor a takeover cost if transferred to the target. That is, the incentive to bid continues to be driven by bidder net synergies. Also, with T being exogenous to the takeover process, it impacts neither the bidder's estimate of S nor the takeover probability π. 13 We have also performed test for nonlinearity exploiting the residual serial correlation in the data. While less powerful than the LR tests, the residual correlation tests also support nonlinearity over linearity.
14 For example, T may be directly observable or inferrable from market trading in the runup period.
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The observed runup now consists of two components:
where we use B ≡ E[B|s, bid] for notational simplicity. The above empirical results show that the nonlinearity predicted by the deal anticipation component πB appears in the data even without adjustment for sample variation in T . Nevertheless, we are interested in whether adjusting for a target-specific estimate of T improves the nonlinear empirical fit in Figure 4A as our theory predicts it should. In particular, adjusting for T may help improve the estimation when total target runups are negative (such as for a poorly performing or financially distressed target). In our model, a negative runup is driven by a negative T which is larger in magnitude than the (positive) expected takeover gains. This occurs in as much as 30% of our sample of 6,150 bids. 15
Assume that T , which is independent of takeover synergies, has an unconditional mean of zero (unconditional on V R ). Then the following is a best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) for T , given observations on V R :
where E(V R ) is measured as the cross-sectional average runup. The BLUE forecast of the partial anticipation component πB of the runup is therefore
Equation (16) describes what we call the adjusted runup-a netting out of an estimate of T from the observed V R . This β-transformation of V R accounts for the idea that a higher V R likely has higher T in it, but not one-for-one as it also depends on V ar(πB) which produces β < 1. Ceteris paribus, when computing πB, the greater V ar(T ) the greater is β and so less weight is placed on the observed runup and more weight on the cross-sectional average runup. Conversely, the higher V ar(πB) the lower is β, and the greater is the weight given to the observed runup in computing πB.
Application of equation (16) requires estimates of β and E(V R ) for each bid. As an estimate of E(V R ) we use the cross-sectional average total runup for the entire sample, which is 9.8%. The estimate of β requires the two variances V ar(T ) and V ar(πB) for each firm. Because a given deal has only a single realization of the signal s, we do not observe a unique V ar(πB) for each target. But if we assume that each s is a drawing from a stationary distribution, then a natural surrogate for V ar(πB) is the average increase in time-series return variability for targets during the runup period relative to an equivalent period that is not influenced by realizations of s. This is because realizations of s impart a shock to the normal stand-alone return process. Therefore, to estimate V ar(πB), we measure the average time-series variance of target returns during the runup period, var(r R ), and subtract the average time-series variance of target returns during the 41 days just prior to the runup period (the "41-day pre-runup period"), var(r −R ). This difference,
, is about 26% of the average runup variance.
To estimate V ar(T ), we start with var(r −R ). However, this variance is a very noisy estimate of the true V ar(T ). To illustrate, in our sample, the correlation between var(r −R ) and the return variance estimated from a 41-day period beginning one year prior to the runup period is only 18%.
Since the cross-section is not aligned in calendar time, changes in average volatilities over time will reduce estimated cross-sectional correlations slightly. This suggests a correlation of perhaps 20%
between an estimate of variance and some notion of true variance in stand-alone value. Thus we create a target-specific estimate of V ar(T ) by giving 20% weight to the target's var(r −R ) and 80% weight to the average var(r −R ) across the sample. Combining these estimates of V ar(T ) with the cross-sectional estimate of V ar(πB) then produces an average beta of 0.77, with a minimum of 0.74 and a maximum of 0.99. 16
Our runup adjustment is successful in pulling in the the tails of the runup data. The minimum runup increases from -83% to -12% and the maximum drops from 244% to 67%. The percentage of negative runups falls from a third of the sample to less than 3% of the sample (146 cases).
16 Our basic conclusions are robust to how much weight we give to the individual estimates of var(r−R) within the range of zero to fifty percent. Changing the weight does not affect the relative ranking of betas, just the spread between them. As shown in equation (16), however, the multiplication of (1 − β) and VR influences the relative rankings of the adjusted runups. Giving more weight to the individual variances raises the linear slope slightly. The slope exceeds -1 with weight of about .25, continuing to increase as the weight increases. With no weight on the individual betas, the slope is -1.04, insignificantly different from minus one.
The results of the linear and non-linear fits using the adjusted runups are shown as model (2) in Table 4 and plotted in Figure 4B . Because we are reducing the spread in runups, the linear slope is accentuated, at -1.01, strongly negative and insignificantly different from minus one. This estimate is sensitive to our estimate of β in the adjustment model, and the other two model estimates with adjustments (model 4 and 7) produce linear slopes that are significantly greater than -1 as predicted.
It is also interesting that the adjustment in (2) improves the nonlinear fit over model (1): Figure   4B shows a definite hump in the left portion of the runups, and the LR1 and LR2 test statistics are up considerably to 125.6 and 64.5 respectively. Also, despite the adjustment in runups, the markup continues to trend towards about 20% at the high end for runups, as we observed in the unadjusted data in Figure 4A as well.
Our BLUE estimator provides an interesting interpretation of how the two components T and πB may be varying in the cross-section of observed runups. First, the amount of T in the average deal, which has a total runup of about 10%, is expected to be zero (the entire 10% reflects average anticipation of deal synergies πB). Second, a deal with a runup greater than 10% is expected to have some positive T in it, provided by the estimate of β(V R − E(V R )). Conversely, deals with runups less than 10% are expected to have T less than zero (negative change in stand alone value).
Finally, we note that, while the linear estimator for T improves the model fit, it is imperfect in that a small percentage of deals still have adjusted runups less than zero. Within our model, these adjustments must contain negative estimation error in spite of the adjustment.
Estimating the markup projections using CARs
While our main empirical analysis uses offer premiums to measure markups, in this section we instead define markups using cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) in response to the takeover bid announcement. This provides a link back to the work of Schwert (1996) who also uses abnormal stock returns to estimate markups. In models (3) and (4) in Table 4 , CAR is estimated using the market model, where the runup is CAR(−41, −2) and the markup is CAR(−1, 1). While Schwert (1996) employs a long event window to measure markups, from day 0 through day 126 relative to the offer announcement, we prefer the shorter window (-1,1) in order to minimize the effect on the markup estimate of subsequent takeover-related events, including bid revisions and withdrawal information. The parameters of the market model are estimated on stock returns from day -297 20 through day -42, and the CAR uses the model prediction errors over the event period.
Like Schwert (1996) , model (3) makes no adjustment in the CAR for target stand-alone value changes (T ) in the runup period beyond that achieved by subtracting the influence of market movements on target stock returns. In model (4), however, as in model (2), we subtract an estimate of T using our BLUE estimator in equation (15). The fitted form of model (4) is shown in Figure   5 .
Although the measurement error in CAR lowers test power, the likelihood ratio test statistics LR1 and LR2 again strongly reject linearity, in both model (3) and (4). According to LR3, the best monotone fit is now indistinguishable from the linear fit (that is, if we do not allow the fit to permit a hump, the model is almost linear), a result not critical for our deal anticipation theory. 17
Interestingly, the nonlinear fit is significantly enhanced by the adjustment for the target stand-alone value change in model (4). This is also reflected in the linear slope coefficient going from -0.09 in model (3) to -0.39 in model (4), suggesting substantially greater degree of substitution on average between runups and markups when we isolate the deal synergy component in the runup, as our theory predicts.
In sum, the empirical models (1) -(4) in Table 4 support the presence of deal anticipation in target runups, while at the same time rejecting the hypothesis that merger negotiations force bidders to systematically raise offer prices with the runup. This conclusion fails to support the view that target runups increase bidder takeover costs in observed takeover bids.
Robustness issues
In this section, we report the results of two robustness checks on model (1) in Table 4 . The first check, implemented in models (5) and (6), adjusts the offer price markup for an estimate of the bid success probability given the bid announcement. The second robustness check, in model (7), adds information available to the market prior to the runup period and which may help predict takeovers.
While not shown here, we have verified that plots based on these two alternative definitions of runups and markups remain consistent with the general concave then convex shape shown in the 17 Nonlinearity is enhanced by subtracting from the runup a market-model alpha measured over the year prior to the runup. A consistent explanation is that recent pre-runup negative target performance indicates synergy benefits to the takeover (e.g. inefficient management) which are factored into offer premiums. We also find that bid premiums are significantly negatively correlated with prior market model alphas, further supporting this argument.
theoretical Figure 2B (these additional plots are available upon request).
The probability of bid success
Recall that the theoretical premium variable V P is the expected premium conditional on the initial bid. Some bids fail, in which case the target receives zero premium. Presumably, the market reaction to the bid adjusts for an estimate of the probability of an ultimate control change. This is apparent from Figure 1 where the target stock price on average runs up to just below 30% while the average offer premium in Table 3 is 45% (unadjusted for market movements). To account for this effect, we multiply the initial offer price with an estimate of the target success probability (where target failure means that no bidder wins the contest).
The success probability is estimated using logit, where the dependent variable takes on a value of one if the target (according to the SDC) is ultimately acquired either by the initial bidder or a rival bidder, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are as defined in Table 5 and the results of the probit estimation is reported in the first two columns of Table 6 . The probit regressions for contest success are significant with a pseudo-R 2 of 21%-22%. The difference between the first and the second column is that the latter includes two dummy variables for the 1990s and the 2000s, respectively. The probability that the takeover is successful increases significantly with the size of the target, and is higher for public acquirers and in horizontal transactions. Bids for targets traded on NYSE or Amex, targets with a relatively high stock turnover (average daily trading volume, defined as the ratio of the number of shares traded and the number of shares outstanding, over days -252 to -43), and targets with a poison pill have a lower likelihood of succeeding.
A high offer premium also tends to increase the probability of takeover success, as does a relatively small run-down from the 52-week high target stock price. Moreover, the coefficients There are a total of 6,103 targets with available data on the characteristics used in the logit estimation. For each of these, we multiply the markup with the estimated success probability computed using the second model in Table 6 (which includes the two decade dummies). This markup is then used in models (5) and (6) reported in Table 4 . Model (5) uses the total (unadjusted) target runup, while model (6) uses the BLUE estimator to adjust the runup for a change in the target stand-alone value, respectively. Consistent with our baseline deal anticipation hypothesis, the linear slope coefficient estimates are negative and less than -1 for both models. Moreover, the likelihood ratio tests LR1 and LR2 for both models strongly reject linearity and monotonicity against nonlinearity, while LR3 also rejects linearity against monotonicity. 19
Information prior to the runup period
Up to this point, we have assumed that the market imparts a negligible likelihood of a takeover into the target price before the beginning of the runup period (day -41 in Figure 1 ). To start the runup period around two calender months prior to the first bid is common in the empirical takeover literature, beginning with Bradley (1980) . Moreover, the large markups in our data (on average 33%, Table 3) indicate that the offer announcement is a significant news (surprise) event. Nevertheless, in this section we check whether including information prior to day -41 in the computation of the runup changes our empirical results.
Suppose the market has already received a signal z on event day -42. Moreover, the market receives a second signal s during the runup period. Now, a bid is made if s + z exceeds a threshold level of synergy gains. Working through the valuations, there is one important change. Define V 0 = π(z)E(B|z) as the expected value of takeover prospects on event day -42 given z and a diffuse 18 Table 6 , in columns 3-6, also shows the coefficients from probit estimations of the probability that the initial control bidder wins the takeover contest. The pseudo-R 2 is somewhat higher for this success probability, ranging from 22% to 28%. Columns 3 and 4 use the same models as the earlier estimations of contest success, while columns 5 and 6 add a variable capturing the percent of target shares owned by the initial control bidder at the time of the bid (Toehold size). Almost all explanatory variables generate coefficients that are similar in size, direction, and significance level to the ones in the probit regressions of contest success. The reason is that in the vast majority of successful contests, it is the initial bidder who wins control of the target. The only difference between the probability estimations is that the existence of a target poison pill does not substantially affect the likelihood that the initial bidder wins. The larger the initial bidder toehold, however, the greater is the probability that the initial bidder wins. 19 We also attempted to adjust for the probability of success by restricting the sample to the 5,035 targets which we know ex post did succeed (the unconditional success probability is 5,035/6,150=0.82). The results of the LR tests for this subsample is indistinguishable from the results of model (5) reported in Table 4. prior on s. The runup and the bid premium are now measured relative to V 0 instead of zero:
and the premium is
In other words, in order to investigate the nonlinear influence of market anticipation prior to the runup period, one must add back V 0 to both the runup and the bid premium. Since the influence of V 0 is a negative one-for-one on both quantities, markups are not affected.
In order to unwind the influence of a possibly known takeover signal z prior to the runup period, we use the following three deal characteristics defined earlier in Table 5 : P ositive toehold, T oehold size, and the negative value of 52 − week high. The positive toehold means that the bidder at some point in the past acquired a toehold in the target, which may have caused some market anticipation of a future takeover. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the signal is increasing in the size of the toehold.
Using these variables, model (7) in Table 4 implements two multivariate adjustments to the model baseline in row (1). The first adjustment, as dictated by equation (17), augments the runup by adding R 0 , where R 0 is the projection of the total runup (
− 1) on P ositive toehold, T oehold size, and the negative value of 52 − week high. The second adjustment is to use as dependent variable the "residual markup" U P , which is the residual from the projection of the total markup,
− 1, on the deal characteristics used to estimate the success probability π in Table 6 while excluding P ositive toehold, T oehold size, and 52 − week high which are used to construct the augmented runup.
Model (7) in Table 4 shows the linear and nonlinear projections of the residual markup on the augmented runup. The linear slope remains negative and highly significant (slope of -0.21, t-value of -12.1). Thus, the costly feedback hypothesis continues to be rejected with the augmented runups.
Moreover, the three LR test statistics confirm that the goodness-of-fit of the nonlinear form of the markup projection is significantly better than either the linear or the monotonic forms, and that monotonicity fits better than linearity. Overall, this evidence further supports the presence of a deal anticipation effect in the runup measured over the runup period.
Bidder gains and target runups
Proposition 3 states that, when bidders and targets share in the takeover gains, bidder gains (ν P ) and target runups (V R ) are positively correlated. That is, market anticipation of shared takeover gains increases the stock prices of both bidders and targets. Bidder gains are decreasing in the target runup only if bidders fail to rationally compute the correct bid threshold level K and accept value-decreasing deals.
We test this proposition empirically using the 3,691 publicly traded bidders in our sample. We estimate ν P as the cumulative abnormal bidder stock return from event day -41 through the day following the first public bid announcement, BCAR(−41, 1). The estimation of BCAR uses a Market Model regression estimated over the period from day -297 through day -42 relative to the initial offer announcement date.
We examine the correlation between BCAR(−41, 1) and target runups in two ways. First, in Figure 6 , we examine the functional form when BCAR(−41, 1) is plotted against the target runup.
Here, the target runup is defined as in Figure 4 :
− 1. Second, we estimate the slope coefficients in multivariate linear regressions of BCAR on alternative definitions of the target runup to show robustness of the correlation estimate.
As has been widely reported in the literature, bidder announcement returns are noisy and on average indistinguishable from zero (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008) . Consistent with this, in our sample, BCAR(−41, −1) averages a statistically insignificant -1.5% with a standard deviation of 17.9. From Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) we also know that bidder announcement returns are unusually negative in the two-year period 1999-2000. In our sample, BCAR(−41, 1) averages -4.7% across our 529 observations from these two years, with a standard deviation of 25.3%. Thus, we add an intercept dummy for these two years in our cross-sectional regressions. Figure 6 shows the estimated linear and nonlinear functional forms of the projection of BCAR on the target runup. Both forms are generated using the beta-function (Eq. 14). The empirical projection in Figure 6 is increasing and concave over the entire range of runups. As noted in the figure heading, our likelihood ratio test rejects linearity in favor of a nonlinear, monotonically 25 increasing shape. Also, while not shown here, when BCAR(−41, 1) is projected on the augmented target runup (defined earlier in Table 4 ), the nonlinear shape is almost identical. Notice first that the six intercept terms in Table 7 range from a significant -2.0% to an insignificant -0.9%, where inclusion of the control variables drives the intercept term to become statistically insignificant. Inclusion of the control variables also raises the regression R 2 , to a high of 4%. Of the control variables, Relative size and All cash receive significantly positive coefficients, while target share turnover (T urnover) receives a significantly negative coefficient.
Consistent with the nonlinear estimation in Figure 6 , the target runup receives a positive and significant coefficient in all six models in Table 7 . In model (1), which uses the total target runup, the coefficient on the target runup is 0.046 with a p-value of 0.008. With the control variables (model 2), the slope coefficient is a virtually unchanged 0.049. In model (3), the target runup is net of the market return over the runup period and it receives a coefficient of 0.074 (p-value < 0.001) without controls and 0.077 with control variables (model 4). In model (5), the target runup is the Augmented T arget Runup from Table 4 (to account for information about merger activity prior to the runup period). The slope coefficient is now 0.046, again highly significant. Finally, Table   7 reports the projection of BCAR on the market model target runup CAR(−41, 2). The slope coefficient is 0.148 (p-value < 0.001), again as predicted by Proposition 2. 21
Overall, the results of Figure 6 and Table 7 support the proposition that bidders and targets share in the takeover gains anticipated by the stock market and impounded into stock prices during 20 Results when adding an adjustments using the BLUE estimator are indistinguishable from the unadjusted results. 21 These results are similar when we estimate Table 7 using the subsample of all-cash offers only.
26 the runup period.
Premium effects of shocks to target runups
In this section we examine the effect on the runup and the offer premium of target stock price shocks during the runup period using two instruments. The first is represented by significant block trades in the target shares. The second is the market return over the runup period, which affects the target stand-alone value. The empirical effects of these instruments complement the analysis in Section 3 above in terms of examining the hypothesis that target runups reflect deal anticipation, and whether runups are costly for bidders.
Target share block trades (toehold purchases)
We identify toehold purchases using the "acquisitions of partial interest" data item in SDC, where the buyer seeks to own less than 50% of the target shares. As shown in Table 8 , over the six months preceding bid announcement [-126,0] , the initial control bidders in our sample acquire a total of 136 toeholds in 122 unique target firms. Of these stakes, 104 toeholds in 94 different targets are purchased over the 42 trading days leading up to and including the day of the announcement of the initial control bid. Thus, less than 2% of our initial control bidders acquire a toehold in the runup period. The typical toehold acquired by the initial bidder in the runup period is relatively large, with a mean of 12% (median 9%). 22 We also collect toehold purchases by rival control bidders (appearing later in the contest) and other investors. As it turns out, rival bidders acquire a toehold in the runup period for only 3 target firms. The average size of these rival short-term toeholds are 7%. Other investors, not bidding for control in the contest, acquire toeholds in 73 target firms (1% of target firms) during the 42 days preceding the control bid. The announcement of 21% (18 of 85) of these toeholds coincide with the 22 Evidence of toeholds is also presented in Betton and Eckbo (2000) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009) . However, those papers do not single out toeholds purchased in the runup period. The timing of the toehold purchase during the runup period is important for its ability to generate takeover rumors. We find that two-thirds of the initial control bidders' toehold acquisitions in the runup period are announced on the day of or the day before the initial control bid [-1,0] . Since the SEC allows investors ten days to file a 13(d), these toeholds have most likely been purchased sometime within the 10-day period preceding and including the offer announcement day. For these cases, the target stock-price runup does not contain information from a public Schedule 13(d) disclosure (but will of course still reflect any market microstructure impact of the trades). The remaining short-term toeholds are all traded and disclosed in the runup period.
announcement of the initial control bid, suggesting that rumors may trigger toehold purchases by other investors. Table 9 reports results of regressions with the target net runup (columns 1-2) and the initial offer premium (columns 3-6) as dependent variables. These regressions test for the impact of toehold acquisitions in the runup period, and whether this impact in turn affects offer premiums (markup effects). The dummy variables Stake bidder and Stake other indicate toehold purchases by the initial control bidder and any other bidder (including rivals), respectively, in the runup window through day 0. The regressions also control for the bidder's total toehold position at the bid (T oehold size), which includes toeholds that the bidder has held for longer periods. Notice first that both Stake bidder and Stake other have a significant and positive impact on the net runup.
At the same time, T oehold size enters with a negative and significant sign. Thus, only short-term toehold purchases have a positive impact on target runups. 23
In columns 3-6 of Table 9 , T oehold size receives a statistically significant and negative coefficient in all four offer premium regressions. That is, as reported elsewhere in the literature (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2009) , bidders with toeholds pay significantly lower premiums. More important for this paper, the two indicators of short-term toehold purchases (Stake bidder and Stake other) do not affect offer premiums. A consistent explanation is that, while short-term toehold acquisitions tend to increase runups, the negotiating parties identify this toehold effect as endogenous to the takeover process and thus do not raise the offer in response. 24
Market movements over the runup period
In Section 3.4 above, we adjusted the target runup for an estimate of the stand-alone value change T over the runup period and estimated the markup projection using the adjusted runups. In this section, we instead identify an a priori observable proxy for T and test whether it affects offer premiums as our theory suggests it should. At this point, it is convenient to return to the notation 23 Several of the other control variables for the target net runup i Table 9 receive significant coefficients. The smaller the target firm (T arget size, defined as the log of target equity market capitalization) and the greater the relative drop in the target stock price from its 52-week high (52-week high, defined as the target stock return from the highest price over the 52 weeks ending on day -43), the higher the runup. Moreover, the runup is higher when the acquirer is publicly traded and in tender offers, and lower for horizontal takeovers. The inclusion of year-fixed effects in the second column does not change any of the results.used in Section 2 and let V R and V P again denote the runup and the offer premium when T = 0.
We instead add the subscript T to indicate the case where T = 0. Since T flows directly through to target shareholders in our setting, the bid premium can be written
and so the runup becomes
Since both V RT and V P T include T , the effect of T nets out in the markup:
Substituting these expressions into the markup projection (4) and rearranging, yields
This says that the net runup V RT − T should be unrelated to the proxy for T , so the one-for-one relation between the offer premium and the proxy for T should hold in a univariate regression setting. 25 We therefore examine Eq. (21) using the linear regressions reported in Table 9 .
Candidate proxies for T include factors that affect the offer premium through the target market value but are uncorrelated with takeover likelihood. Candidates are the cumulative market return over the runup period, a CAPM benchmark (beta times the market return), or the target industry return. All of these are subject to their own varying degrees of measurement error, and we select the perhaps simplest measure, the market return during the runup period or M arket runup. We have also experimented with more complex measures such as the market-adjusted industry return over the runup period which, as it turned out, does not add explanatory power to the regressions reported in Table 9 .
Columns 1-2 in Table 9 show that the Net runup is linearly related to the Market runup. Since our theory predicts that these two variables should be uncorrelated, we use the Whitened net runup in the premium regressions, where the Whitened net runup is the unstandardized residuals from a regression of Net runup on Market runup. As expected from Eq. (21), columns 3-6 show that the coefficient on M arket runup is highly significant and close to unity in all four offer premium regressions. This is evidence that merger negotiations allow the market-driven portion of the target return to flow through to the target in the form of a higher offer premium-on a virtual one-to-one basis. Also as expected, the variable W hitened net runup (the target runup net of the market return) is highly significant when included as an explanatory variable for the offer premium. 26
Inclusion of W hitened net runup substantially increases the regression R 2 (from approximately 8% to 34%) but without significantly altering the size of the coefficient on M arket runup. 27
Conclusion
Conventional intuition in the merger literature holds that, when the runup before a deal announcement reflects deal anticipation, the premium for that deal should not change with the runup-an increase in the runup should be offset by a dollar-for-dollar decrease in the markup. This is a straightforward application of rational partial anticipation in which there is no feedback loop from market pricing to deal terms. Yet the extant literature rejects this type of substitution hypothesis by showing that bid premiums tend to increase almost dollar for dollar with runups in the cross-section, so that markups do not decline anything close to one-for-one.
To address this puzzle, we first develop a simple takeover model with rational bidding and market deal anticipation. The model demonstrates that the relationship between runups and markups is considerably more complex than previously thought. The model permits takeover rumors to inform investors not only of the takeover likelihood (the conventional assumption) but also of the deal value. The deal value positively influences both the runup and the markup, causing the link between runups and markups to exceed minus one-for-one (and to be inherently nonlinear). We then posit a costly feedback loop from runups to offer premiums in which the bidder transfers the runup to the target. This feedback loop is testable as it implies a strictly positive correlation 26 In an alternative specification (not shown here), we include Net runup/π, where π is the probability of deal success used above. This leaves the coefficient for the Market runup unchanged, but reduces the coefficient for the net runup to 0.66 (p-value ¡0.001). Measurement error in π introduces noise, however, and reduces the adjusted R 2 to 26%.
27 The offer premium regressions also show that premiums are decreasing in T arget size and in 52-week high, both of which are highly significant. Offer premiums are also higher in tender offers and when the acquirer is publicly traded. The greater offer premiums paid by public over private bidders is also reported by Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2007) .
between runups and markups.
Our large-sample empirical tests strongly reject the costly feedback loop hypothesis while supporting rational market deal anticipation. The tests include an adjustment for changes in target stand-alone values during the runup period. Tests performed on runups net of estimated stand-alone value changes show more negative slope and thus strengthen the rejection of the costly feedback loop, while giving additional support to the deal anticipation hypothesis. Further perspective on deal anticipation is provided by studying bidder returns. When the market anticipates a synergistic takeover, bidder gains should be increasing in the target runup, which our empirical evidence supports.
We also examine effects on the offer premium of exogenous shocks to the target stock price during the runup period. We show that block trades in the target, including bidder toehold purchases, tend to fuel target runups without increasing offer premiums (if anything, premiums are lower in bids where those trades occur). Moreover, the market return over the runup period is found to flow through to target shareholders by an almost dollar-for-dollar increase in the offer premium.
This flow-through is reasonable and logical as it does not increase bidder takeover costs. Overall, we conclude that target runups do not add to bidder takeover costs at the intensive margin.
Finally, what if, contrary to our model, the market systematically ignores the information in takeover signals-a type of market inefficiency? In this case, markups will be independent of runups, producing a zero slope coefficient in the linear markup regression. As shown above, a zero linear slope is also predicted by rational deal anticipation along with nonlinearity of the markup projection. Since our empirical tests strongly reject a zero linear slope and confirm the nonlinearity of the markup projection, this market inefficiency hypothesis is also rejected in favor of our rational deal anticipation theory.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
For the slope of the markup function to be positive, d(V * P − V * R )/ds and dV * R /ds must have the same sign. By the assumption that B increases in S and E(S) increases in s, it is straightforward
The first derivative w.r.t s is:
Using Leibnitz rule and noting that dK * /ds = (1/θ)(dV * R /ds),
where g (S|s) is the first derivative of g(S|s). Substituting (24) into (23) and rearranging yields
Since all terms in (25) are positive, dV * R /ds is positive.
A.2 The markup projection with uniform uncertainty
The functions below are depicted in Figure 2 . Suppose the posterior distribution of S given s is uniform: S|s ∼ U (s − ∆, s + ∆). The density is g(S|s) = 1/(2∆), and the takeover probability is
, where K = C/θ, and 0 < π < 1 for K − ∆ < s < K + ∆.
We have that:
32 which approaches (1 − θ)K when s approaches K − ∆ from above. Moreover, since V R = πV P ,
The derivatives with respect to s are:
Over the range where a bid is possible but uncertain (0 < π < 1), the first derivative of the markup projection is:
When K < ∆ (i.e, deals where uncertainty is high relative to K), as shown in Figure 2B , the slope in (29) starts positive for low s and reaches a maximum at s = 0 before trending negative. To show that the markup projection has a maximum, note first that
Since we assume dV R /ds > 0 (and the inverse ds/dV R > 0), it follows that
and the sign is negative as the derivative of the slope (29) w.r.t. s is −∆/(s + ∆) 2 .
Figure 1 Percent average target runup, markup and total offer premium in event time.
The figure plots the percent average target abnormal (market risk adjusted) stock return over the runup period (trading day -41 through day -2) and the announcement period (day -1 through day 1) for the total sample of 6,150 U.S. public targets . Trading days relative to day of initial takeover bid announcement (day 0)
Figure 2 Theoretical target valuation changes and markup projection.
The market receives a signal (rumor) s about a potential takeover with synergy S, where the posterior distribution of S is uniform: S|s ∼ U (s − ∆, s + ∆), where ∆ = 4 in this figure. The takeover benefit function has target and bidder equally sharing synergy gains (θ = 0.5), and bid cost are C = 0.5. VR is the target runup conditional on s, VP is the expected target deal value conditional on s and a bid, VP − VR is the markup, and π = P rob(S ≥ K) is the probability of a takeover bid given s, where K = C/θ is the threshold for the bidder to gain from bidding. Panel B plots the corresponding markup projection. See Appendix A.2 for the functional forms. In Panel A, the markup is measured as (OP/P−2) − 1, where OP is the offer price and P−2 is the target stock price on day -2 relative to the first offer announcement date, and the unadjusted runup is (P−2/P−42) − 1. Panel B uses adjusted runups, defined as the unadjusted runup in Panel A minus an estimate of the target's stand-alone value change T in the runup period, using the BLUE estimator in Eq. (15) The markup is the target CAR(−1, 1) relative to the day of the first offer announcement (day 0). The runup is CAR(−41, −2) adjusted for an estimate of the target's stand-alone value change T over the runup period, using the BLUE estimator in Eq. (15) in the text. The figure plots the functions estimated over the middle 98% of the adjusted runups. All forms are estimated using the beta function (Eq. 14). Total sample of 6,146 bids, 1980-2008 This table shows the main empirical predictions of the deal anticipation theory developed in Section 2. VR is the target runup, VP − VR is the offer price markup, VP is the conditional expected target deal value, and G is the conditional expected bidder takeover deal value net of bidding costs. For convenience, VR and VP is used to denote both the theoretical and the empirical values of the runup and the expected target deal value (although only the empirical values may include a target stand-alone value change during the runup period). Λ(VR) is a nonlinear transformation of VR using the beta-function (Eq. 14 below). The cross-sectional estimation also includes a number of control variables which are not shown here (defined in Table 5) .
Revision in target valuation

Economic model Econometric model Empirical Tests
Proposition 1: Rational deal anticipation a When the true projection is nonlinear, the linear slope coefficient is an average across the data and must be strictly greater than -1 (Proposition 1). b The markup projection is strictly increasing in the runup (Proposition 2). Thus, evidence of a zero or negative linear regression slope rejects the costly feedback hypothesis. c A slope b < 0 is also predicted if bids are value-destroying for the bidder.
Table 2 Sample selection
Description of the sample selection process. An initial bid is the first control bid for the target in 126 trading days (six months). Bids are grouped into takeover contests, which end when there are no new control bids for the target in 126 trading days. All stock prices pi are adjusted for splits and dividends, where i is the trading day relative to the date of announcement (day 0). The table shows the mean and median offer premium, markup, target stock-price runup and net runup for the sample of 6,150 initial control bids for U.S. publicly traded target firms in 1980-2008. The premium is (OP/P−42) − 1, where OP is the price per share offered by the initial control bidder and Pi is the target stock price on trading day i relative to the takeover announcement date (i = 0), adjusted for splits and dividends. The markup is (OP/P−2) − 1, the runup is (P−2/P−42) − 1 and and the net runup is (P−2/P−42) − (M−2/M−42), where Mi is the value of the equal-weighted market portfolio on day i.
Number
Sample
Offer premium Markup Runup Net runup size 
The projection is
where Λ(v, w) is the beta distribution with shape parameters v and w, max and min are respectively the maximum and minimum VR in the data, a is an overall intercept, b is a scale parameter, and is a residual error term. When constraining the shape to be linear, the model delivers OLS estimates of a and b, which are reported below. The reported t-values are for b = 0. LR is the likelihood ratio test statistic, distributed χ 2 (d). LR1 tests nonlinearity against linearity (d = 2, 1% critical value 9.2). LR2 tests monotonicity against linearity (d = 1, critical value 6.6). LR3 ≡ LR1 − LR2 tests nonlinearity against monotonicity (d = 1, critical value 6.6). a This projection uses the runup adjusted for the cross-sectional variation in target stand-alone value (equation 16 in the text). VR is the total runup in model (1), and the average β used to adjust VR is 0.77, with a max (min) of 0.99 (0.74), respectively. See the text for details of the estimation of adjustment parameter β. b Target cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) are computed using the estimated Market Model parameters: rit = αi + βirmt + uit, where rit and rmt are the daily returns on stock i and the value-weighted market portfolio, and uit is a residual error term. The estimation period is from day -297 to day -43 relative to the day of the announcement of the initial bid. c This projection is for the subsample with available data on the target-, bidder-and deal characteristics used to estimate the probability π of bid success in Table 6 . The projection includes the effect of these variables by multiplying the total markup with the estimated value of π. d Residual markup, UP , is the residual from the projection of the total markup,
− 1, on the deal characteristics used to estimate the success probability π in Table 6 , excluding P ositive toehold, T oehold size, and 52 − week high which are used to construct the augmented runup. Variable definitions are in Table 5 . e The enhancement R0 in the augmented runup adds back into the runup the effect of information that the market might use to anticipate possible takeover activity prior to the runup period. R0 is the projection of the total runup (
− 1) on the deal characteristics P ositive toehold, T oehold size, and the negative value of 52 − week high, all of which may affect the prior probability of a takeover (prior to the runup period). The augmented runup is the total runup plus R0. Variable definitions are in Table 5 . 
CRSP
Poison pill
The target has a poison pill (dummy) SDC
52-week high
Change in the target stock price from the highest price P high over the 52-weeks ending on day -43, P−42/P high − 1 CRSP
B. Bidder characteristics
Toehold
The acquirer owns shares in the target when announcing the bid (dummy) SDC Toehold size Percent target shares owned by the acquirer when announcing the bid SDC
Stake bidder
The initial bidder buys a small equity stake in the target during the runup period through day 0 (dummy)
SDC
Stake other
Another investor buys a small equity stake in the target during the runup period through day 0 (dummy)
SDC
Acquirer public
The acquirer is publicly traded (dummy) SDC
Horizontal
The bidder and the target has the same primary 4-digit SIC code (dummy) SDC >20% new equity The consideration includes a stock portion which exceeds 20% of the acquirer's shares outstanding (dummy) SDC
C. Contest characteristics
Premium
Bid premium defined as (OP/P−42) − 1, where OP is the offer price. SDC,CRSP
Net runup
Target net runup defined as (P−2/P−42) − (M−2/M−42), where Mi is the value of the equal-weighted market portfolio on day i.
CRSP
Market runup
Stock-market return during the runup period defined as M−2/M−42 − 1, where Mi is the value of the equal-weighted market portfolio on day i.
CRSP
Whitened net runup
The unstandardized residuals from a regression of the target Net runup on the Market runup.
CRSP
Tender offer
The initial bid is a tender offer (dummy) SDC Table 6 Probabilities of contest success and the initial control bidder wins
The table shows coefficient estimates from logit regressions for the probability that the contest is successful (columns 1-2) and that the initial control bidder wins (columns 3-6). P-values are in parenthesis. The sample is 6,103 initial control bids for public US targets, 1980 US targets, -2008 , with a complete set of control variables (defined in Table 5 a Target cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) are computed using the estimated Market Model parameters: rit = α + βrmt + uit, where rit and rmt are the daily returns on stock i and the value-weighted market portfolio, and uit is a residual error term. The estimation period is 252 trading days prior to day -41 relative to the day of the announcement of the initial bid.
is the return on the equal-weighted market portfolio in the runup period (from day -42 to day -2). Table 5 for variable definitions. Of these variables, Relative size and All cash receive significantly positive coefficients, while T urnover receives a significantly negative coefficient. The remaining control variables receive coefficients that are insignificant from zero. Table 9 Premium effects of market runups and of toehold purchases in the runup period
The table shows OLS coefficient estimates in regressions with target net runup (VRT − T ) and the offer premium VP , respectively, as dependent variables. Market rationality implies (Eq. (21) in the text):
T is the target stand-alone value change in the runup period (measured here as the market runup M−2/M−42), the net runup VR − T is (P−2/P−42) − (M−2/M−42), and the offer premium VP is (OP/P−42) − 1, where Pi is the target stock price and Mi is the value of the equal-weighted market portfolio on trading day i relative to the initial control bid date. OP is the offer price. The whitened net runup is the residuals from an OLS regression of the net runup on the market runup. Sample of 6,100 initial control bids for public US targets, 1980 US targets, -2008 , with a complete set of control variables (defined in Table 5 ). p-values in parentheses. 
